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Social Policy Expansion, Democracy and Social Mobilisation in Brazil and Mexico 
Introduction 
Social policy in Latin America has been transformed in recent decades. After a long period 
that lasted for most of the twentieth century when it was based on social insurance 
programmes of limited coverage, since the 1980s, coinciding with processes of 
democratisation, new programmes have been created to take social protection to groups of 
the population never reached before. This process can be observed throughout the region, 
however, the modes of expansion and their consequences for the welfare of the population 
show great variations. The Brazilian and Mexican healthcare reforms represent two exemplary 
cases to explore the causal processes of two different policy reform paths that have had 
different outcomes. 
Before the reforms, healthcare in both countries was provided through social insurance 
programmes with coverage levels that barely surpassed half of the population (Filgueira and 
Filgueira, 2002). The Brazilian reform consisted on the replacement of the social insurance 
programme with a system that offered universal coverage as a right of citizenship –a rare case 
of universalism in Latin American social policy–. In Mexico, coverage was expanded by 
layering a targeted insurance programme along the existing social insurance programmes, 
reinforcing the segmentation of public healthcare provision. This article aims to explain why 
different reform models were chosen in each country after decades of similar paths in public 
healthcare provision. The main argument made here is that the difference is due to the 
influence that social mobilisation had on processes of democratisation and institutional and 
policy changes. 
The article is divided in four parts. The first one presents the rationale, objectives and 
approach to the comparative study. The second section provides a brief narrative of the history 
of each healthcare system. The third section explains in comparative perspective the causal 
mechanisms of the reforms, discussing the ways in which democracy and social mobilisation 
shaped each reform and the timing and sequencing of events. The final section offers some 
concluding reflections. 
Comparing healthcare in Brazil and Mexico: rationale, objectives and approach 
When it comes to social policy, different reform models will have different impact on the welfare 
of the population. By locking-in the middle classes, increasing the amount of resources 
available for redistribution and the levels of political support for redistributive policies, social 
programmes based on universal principles are commonly viewed as holding a stronger 
potential at addressing social problems. On the contrary, targeted programmes are signalled 
for dividing the population, discouraging the payment of taxes by non-beneficiaries, limiting 
public resources available to tackle social problems and diminishing levels of political support 
for redistribution (Korpi and Palme, 1998, Huber and Stephens, 2012, Ortiz and Cummins, 
2011). Evidence from the Brazilian and Mexican healthcare systems would confirm these 
arguments. Public healthcare spending in Brazil has remained at higher levels than in Mexico 
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since the mid-1990s, with an increasing gap in recent years (CEPAL, 2013); recent 
quantitative research on the impact of both systems has revealed that the Brazilian universal 
system is more progressive and benefits low income population to a larger extent than the 
Mexican segmented system (Lustig et al., 2013).  
Democracy has been linked to social policy expansion in Latin America under diverse 
mechanisms. In the cases compared in this article, both healthcare reforms were introduced 
immediately after each country’s transitions to pluralist democratic systems. The article 
reviews different mechanisms by which democracy has been associated to policy changes in 
the region, in order to identify and test the one(s) that can explain the choices of divergent 
reform models in the two cases under analysis. The main objective is to explain how, in the 
context of recent democratisation, can a universal healthcare system that holds greater 
potential to improve living standards emerge, and in contrast, what are the political conditions 
that can lead to the reproduction of an unequal and fragmented model of welfare provision. 
The article makes use of a variety of sources from different bodies of literature to build a 
comprehensive account of each policy reform process and their causes, including health and 
history journals, and published interviews with stakeholders. Sources were selected because 
they either explain the characteristics of each reform, the logics that were followed in their 
design or the political socio-political arrangements that led to their approval. 
The study uses historical-institutionalism (Pierson, 2004, Hacker, 2004) and process tracing 
(Bennett and Checkel, 2015b, Mahoney, 2015, Collier, 2011) to make causal inferences about 
the reforms. Historical institutionalism offers the first approximation to the conditions that 
triggered and shaped each reform, but does not explain the different choices of reform models. 
Process tracing and an ideational perspective explain why different models were selected.  
Healthcare Development in Brazil and Mexico 
For most of the twentieth century, in the contexts of corporatist, populists and 
(semi)authoritarian regimes, public healthcare provision in Brazil and Mexico was based on 
social insurance programmes for workers paying contributions and their families, excluding 
large sectors of the population. After each country’s transition to pluralist competitive electoral 
systems, healthcare was reformed to expand coverage to the population previously excluded, 
but the models followed were different: Brazil substituted the social insurance programme with 
a universal programme that offered coverage as a right of citizenship, Mexico created an 
additional insurance programme targeted at poor population. 
The Brazilian Case 
Brazil adopted its first social security legislation, based on social insurance principles, in the 
second decade of the twentieth century in what was known as the Lei Eloy Chavez, which 
introduced the Caixas de Aposentadoria e Pensões (CAPs) that tied healthcare entitlements 
to worker and employer’s contributions, under tripartite administration with representatives 
from employer organisations and trade unions (Huber, 1996, Hunter and Borges Sugiyama, 
2009). In the 1930s the government of Getúlio Vargas created the Institutos de Aposentaduria 
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e Pensões (IAPs) that replaced the CAPs, organising the system by professional associations. 
This reform reinforced the philosophy of social insurance in healthcare provision established 
a decade earlier although following a more centralised fashion, yet still highly stratified. Later, 
in 1945 Vargas would attempt to unify the social security system but failed due to the strong 
opposition of an empowered labour movement.  
Until the 1960s Brazil experienced periods of varying degrees of political liberalisation and 
pluralist democracy until 1964, when a coup against the government of João Goulart 
established military rule that would last for 20 years. The military government replaced union 
representatives in the administration of social security with government and military 
employees, and unified the social insurance schemes through the creation of the Instituto 
Nacional de Previdência Social (INPS). This period was also be critical because it set the 
ground for the increasing presence of the private sector in the healthcare system through the 
form of subcontracts, i.e. the INPS provided a public service which was delivered by the private 
sector (Fleury, 2011).  
By the late 1970s and early 1980s, pressures for greater democratisation had grown stronger, 
converging in a common-for-all protest movement called Diretas Já (Direct Elections Now!). 
Brazil’s political democratic transition encompassed the transition from military rule with the 
participation of a broad range of social, cultural and political demands. The country 
experienced the emergence of new grass-roots social movements that shaped the mode of 
the political transition, like the novo sindicalismo (new unionism) in the industrial, urban 
peripheries of Sao Paulo, and the Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra (MST), 
organising landless peasants. These and other movements stemmed from the ecclesiastical 
base communities (CEBS), a Catholic grass-roots political movement, popular in Latin 
America in the 1960s and 1970s, which sought popular emancipation from below (Gohn, 2010, 
Caldeira, 2008).  
The Movimento pela Reforma Sanitária (Movement for Health Reform) would be of particular 
importance for welfare reform. It emerged in the 1970s with the support, again, of the Catholic 
Church and universities, and the mobilisation in several cities of urban sectors discontent with 
the results of the existing healthcare system. The movement gathered progressive public 
health practitioners who demanded a new agenda with regards to healthcare. Social 
movements like the ones mentioned here positioned the narrative of the country’s ‘social debt’ 
with the poor majority and the establishment of social rights in the agenda of the transition 
(Sader, 1999, Cornwall and Shankland, 2008). 
Eventually, civil rule returned in 1985, when the candidate from the Partido do Movimento 
Democrático Brasileiro (PMDB) won the first indirect elections in which civilians were allowed to 
participate in more than two decades. The PMDB was a centrist umbrella party in which several 
groups from varied political orientation opposed to military rule coalesced, but crucial to its 
arrival to power was the alliance with the conservative Partido da Frente Liberal (PFL), formed 
by defectors of the official political party of the military government, named Aliança 
Renovadora Nacional (ARENA), that had joined the Diretas Já movement (Santos, 2003). 
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Members of the Movimento pela Reforma Sanitária gained leverage in the transition 
government. Notably Sérgio Arouca, one of its leaders, militant of the Communist party and 
researcher of the National School of Public Health, became a key advisor of the Ministry of 
Health. This group of health activists and academics came to be known as the sanitaristas. 
The sanitaristas received the support of the democratising political elite because their action 
was considered central to undermine the Brazilian ‘social debt’ (Sader, 1999); they were 
influenced by the Declaration of Alma-Ata of the International Conference on Primary Health 
Care of 1978, where health was declared to be a fundamental human right; and were able to 
occupy the central space of the 8th National Health Conference of 1986 of Brazil, where health 
was declared ‘to be the duty of the state and the right of the citizen’ (Cornwall and Shankland, 
2008). Previous national health conferences had note lead to the changes that the 1986 one 
did.  
The transition would have its cornerstone in the writing of the new Constitution of 1988. Based 
on the work of the 1986 conference and with the sanitaristas playing a central role in its drafting 
(Rosàrio Costa, 2013), the Constitution recognised healthcare as a citizenship right secured 
by the state, guided by the principles of universalisation, equity and comprehensiveness; and 
mandated the creation of the Sistema Unico de Saúde (SUS). The SUS incorporated a 
‘participatory ethos’ in the form of participatory health councils for the general population, and 
a national health conference for health care professionals, that aimed to integrate popular 
participation into the health care organisational model (Baiocchi, 2001, Baiocchi et al., 2008).  
The SUS replaced the social insurance healthcare system of the INPS, legally extending 
coverage to the entire population under one unified system, with services offered as a right of 
citizenship free at the point of service. It would incorporate elements of the previous system 
like the participation of private providers, which resulted from the negotiation process for its 
creation, although under similar regulations than public providers securing, in principle, the 
notion of universal public service. In the early 1990s, the first president elected in direct 
elections was Fernando Collor de Melo, who headed a government of neoliberal orientation, 
as was the trend across Latin America in that period. Collor de Melo attempted but failed to 
dismantle the SUS, and after his impeachment on corruption charges, the development of 
healthcare under the SUS continued (Tolentino Silva, 2009). 
The Mexican Case 
The first national social insurance legislation in Mexico was the Ley del Seguro Social (LSS), 
created in 1943, which mandated the creation of the Mexican Social Insurance Institute 
(IMSS), to provide benefits like healthcare and pensions to waged workers in formal 
employment paying contributions.(Brachet-Marquez, 2007). The IMSS was funded by payroll 
contributions from workers, employers and the state and was administered by a tripartite 
council of representatives from the three instances. The Secretariat for Labour was granted 
with the power to designate the labour and business organisations that would be represented 
(LSS, 1943). In 1960 an additional social insurance system was created to provide healthcare 
and other benefits to public sector workers, who in some cases had been receiving services 
and benefits since the 1920’s under separate schemes (Carrillo Castro, 1987). For population 
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not covered by social insurance, like the self-employed, workers in informal employment and 
rural workers, and their families, only minimal and limited services which required the payment 
of user fees, were offered through the Secretariat for Health (SS) (Frenk et al., 1999, Lopez 
Acuña, 1980).  
The development of healthcare under these fragmented structure continued for several 
decades, period in which Mexico had a hegemonic party regime. Under this regime, elections 
were celebrated systematically, without real electoral competition because the dominant party, 
the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), held an overwhelming control of political and 
economic resources and won virtually every election in the country (Crespo, 2003, Sartori, 
1976).  
Pressures for greater democratisation began to rise in the 1980s in the context of severe 
economic crises and the liberalisation of the economy. Contrary to the Brazilian case, no 
unified movement emerged in support of democracy. From the left, a faction that had split from 
the PRI in protest of neoliberal economic reforms, joined leftist parties and organisations to 
support the candidacy of Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas in the 1988 elections (Rodríguez Araujo, 
2010). From the right, the conservative Partido Acción Nacional (PAN), which had represented 
the main opposition to the PRI since the 1930s, gained strength with the incorporation of 
business leaders (Loaeza, 1999). The most contested elections in the country’s history until 
that year took place in 1988, when the PRI candidate Carlos Salinas defeated Cárdenas 
amidst strong accusations of fraud (Rodríguez Araujo, 2010). 
 
The country would not transit towards a pluralist democratic system until a decade later. In 
fact, the PRI recovered fast from the 1988 elections and swept the 1991 mid-term elections, 
aided by a slight economic recovery and a number of clientelistic policies (Rodríguez Araujo, 
2010). It was not until 1996, after new political and economic crises, that the definitive electoral 
reform was negotiated. This reform left in the hands of a citizen council the organisation and 
supervision of elections; the PRI lost the majority in the Chamber of Deputies in 1997, and the 
presidency in 2000 to the PAN’s candidate Vicente Fox (Elizondo Mayer-Serra and Nacif, 
2002).  
The healthcare reform was introduced in 2002 by the Fox government. The team of reformers 
was led by the Health Secretary, Julio Frenk, former director of the private research institute 
Mexican Foundation for Health (FUNSALUD), funded by private corporations, among them 
pharmaceutical companies and private hospital consortiums (FUNSALUD, 2015). Most 
secretaries and high-ranking officials of the Secretariat for Health since 1982 have been 
associated with FUNSALUD, and the policy model followed based on regulated competition 
has been the one proposed by that institute, materialised during the Fox administration 
(Abrantes, 2010, Laurell, 2014). Although he had worked for the Secretariat for Health before, 
Frenk was working at the World Health Organisation (WHO) when he was recruited by Fox to 
join his presidential campaign (Abrantes, 2010, Laurell, 2007). Whilst working at the WHO, 
Frenk was criticised for favouring the evaluation of countries that had market-insurance based 
health systems, like Colombia, in detriment of countries with universal systems, like Cuba, 
which actually registered better indicators (Navarro, 2000). 
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The reform model was conceived by reformers years before (Frenk, 1994). Frenk had 
envisioned a system where public and private providers would compete for the allocation of 
services, where beneficiaries would have the option of choosing providers and where the 
government would act as purchaser (Frenk, 2005). Frenk’s team first proposed to subsidise 
the affiliation of low income families to an IMSS voluntary health insurance scheme which had 
existed since 1997, with poor results due to the high premiums that were charged. That 
initiative would have resulted in a less fragmented system, but it failed as the IMSS workers’ 
union opposed the creation of a market system of subcontracting that would have forced the 
IMSS to compete with other institutions (Lakin, 2010). 
The decision was then taken to create a voluntary insurance programme along the existing 
social insurance ones. The new programme was called Seguro Popular de Salud (SPS). It 
offered health insurance to families with no social insurance coverage, albeit only for a limited 
package of 78 medical interventions. The number of interventions covered has increased 
since then, but unlike the social insurance system, full coverage has never been achieved and 
many illnesses remain excluded. The programme was funded by contributions from the 
insured families and the government. Family’s contributions varied depending on the income 
decile where the family was placed after a means-test, with poor families belonging to the first 
two deciles being exempted (SS, 2005). 
The design of SPS sought the objectives of creating a culture of prepayment among 
beneficiaries (SS, 2005); establishing a rational method for the allocation of resources by 
separating funding from service provider; and introducing a market system where a public 
purchaser, either the Secretariat for Health or a social insurance institute, would contract out 
public or private providers in a competitive environment and where patients’ choice would be 
enhanced by allowing them to select the provider (Frenk et al., 2006). 
The reform was debated in Congress, where the exemption of poor families from paying 
contributions was set as a concession to the leftist PRD, since the reformers original proposal 
considered only a partial subsidisation of contribution fees, not a total exemption. The 
programme was consolidated shortly by the rapid legal affiliation of beneficiaries, even if that 
implied misclassifying their income to place them within the exempted group, prompted by the 
PAN government’s need for raising levels of support before the 2006 presidential elections, 
even if the infrastructure to provide services was absent or limited in many communities (Lakin, 
2010). 
 
 
Explaining the Choice of Reform Models 
From an institutional perspective, Hacker (2004) identified four modes of policy change that 
result from different sets of political conditions that reformers face. The Brazilian reform 
represents a case of formal revision that occurs when there are weak support coalitions of the 
existing policy, few veto players of the proposed change, and high levels of discretion by 
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reformers (Hacker, 2004, Pierson, 2004). In Brazil the previous social insurance system did 
not have strong support coalitions, since the government had removed official trade unions 
from the system’s administration (Tolentino Silva, 2009). Trade unions could have represented 
an obstacle to the introduction of the SUS, like it happened in Argentina when a universal 
healthcare reform was proposed to replace social insurance shortly after the democratic 
transition too (Lo Vuolo, 1998). The reform did not face strong opposition in Congress as a 
broad coalition was formed to support it but the design of the SUS did incorporate important 
legacies from the social insurance system as a result of the negotiations with relevant actors, 
notably municipal governments and private sector providers (Cornwall and Shankland, 2008, 
Rosàrio Costa, 2013). 
The Mexican reform represents a case of layering, that occurs when an existing policy has 
strong support coalitions, and reformers are forced to work around institutions with vested 
interests by adding a new policy along the existing one (Hacker, 2004, Pierson, 2004). 
Reformers took the decision to create an additional programme when they faced the 
opposition of the powerful IMSS workers’ union, since their first proposal involved the internal 
conversion of that social insurance programme. Reformers also had to modify SPS’s design 
as part of the negotiations with the Secretariat for Finance and left-wing parties in Congress 
(Dion, 2010, Lakin, 2010).  
The analysis of the modes of policy change under this perspective can explain the policy 
outputs, namely the final design of the new healthcare programmes that came out of the 
reform processes; however, it does not explain policy inputs, namely the choices of the reform 
models that were originally selected in each country: a universal model with access based on 
social citizenship in Brazil, or an insurance model targeted at low income families in Mexico.  
The effects of democracy 
Process tracing refers to the examination of intermediate steps of a political or social 
phenomena in a case or a small number of cases, to establish causal inferences about how 
that phenomena took place and how its outcomes were generated (Collier, 2011, Mahoney, 
2015, Bennett and Checkel, 2015a). The approach is used for within case studies, but the 
comparative perspective is recommended to increase the power of inferential claims (Bennett 
and Checkel, 2015a). The first tasks of the approach are to identify the possible causes of the 
event that is trying to be explained, then to dismiss the ones that are considered to be dead 
ends and focus on the ones that are believed to hold a stronger explanatory potential 
(Mahoney, 2015, Bennett and Checkel, 2015a). In the present study, the event that is trying 
to be explained is the choice of healthcare reform models in each country. 
Both reforms have in common that they were introduced immediately after each country’s 
democratic transition. Democracy has been found to have a strong association with social 
policy expansion in Latin America, so it would constitute an optimal starting point. A review of 
the literature reveals that there are several mechanisms with which democracy has found to 
influence social policy expansion. One frequently noted effect is that electoral competition 
prompts governments to act in the social policy field, as politicians introduce and expand social 
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programmes to compete for the sympathy of the electorate (Kaufman and Nelson, 2004, Dion, 
2010). Democracy has been found to make politicians more responsive to popular demands 
in order to gain electoral support (Kaufman and Nelson, 2004). On recent expansion 
processes, it has been argued that governments have expanded social policies to benefit 
informal sector workers and their families, historically excluded from social insurance, because 
they represent a new cross-class coalition of growing electoral power, negligible in previous 
decades of authoritarian rule but no longer under pluralist systems (Dion, 2010).  
At the time when the reforms were introduced, both countries were experiencing levels of 
electoral competition unprecedented in their histories and the political parties in power were 
facing strong competition. Although in Brazil the PMDB had won the congressional elections 
of 1986 by a large margin, competition rose as new parties appeared and in the 1989 
presidential elections, the PMDB candidate obtained less than five per cent of the voting 
(Nervo Codato, 2006). In Mexico, the PAN had won the presidential elections of 2000 with 
only slightly more than 40 per cent of the votes, did not win the majority in neither chamber of 
Congress and faced fierce competition from the PRI and the leftist Partido de la Revolución 
Democrática (PRD) (Crespo, 2003). 
Electoral competition could explain why politicians took the decision to promote and approve 
the reforms, it might have motivated Brazilian congressional members to repel the counter-
reform attempted by the Collor de Melo government, and had an effect on the fast 
consolidation of the SPS’s affiliation in Mexico, as multiple declarations by Fox and his 
successor Felipe Calderón also from the PAN, hailing the programme as one of the main 
achievements of their administrations for campaign purposes could suggest (REF). However, 
the fact that this condition was present in both countries would not be sufficient to explain why 
different reform models were chosen. 
Decentralisation processes associated to democracy have also been linked to social policy 
reforms in the region (Haggard and Kaufman, 2008). In the past, centralised structures were 
blamed for the lack of government responsiveness to local needs and demands, so since the 
1980s a number of examples can be identified of attempts to transfer more resources and 
delegate responsibilities to regional and local governments. The Brazilian healthcare reform 
incorporated a decentralised logic and negotiations with municipal governments were crucial 
for its approval (Cornwall and Shankland, 2008). The Mexican reform also considered the 
decentralised provision of services, mounting SPS on the structure that had already been 
transferred by the federal government to state governments (Frenk et al., 2006, Lakin, 2010). 
However, following this explanatory path would not generate significant results, because even 
if decentralisation would have been the main objective pursued by reformers, it would not be 
sufficient to explain why they chose different reform models to achieve it.  
The ideological orientation of political parties is another way in which democracy has been 
found to propel welfare policy reform, especially by enabling the formation and arrival to power 
of left-wing parties and coalitions. The link between leftist parties in government and 
universalist social policies has been observed for a long time in European countries, and is 
the basis of the power-resources theory of welfare state development (Korpi and Palme, 1998, 
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Esping-Andersen, 1985). The same argument has been made recently for Latin America 
(Pribble, 2014, Huber and Stephens, 2012). However, the Brazilian universal system was not 
introduced by a left-wing government. The PMDB is a centrist party, which at the time of the 
healthcare reform had actually built an alliance with the conservative Partido da Frente Liberal 
(PFL) (Mainwaring, 1999). The governments of parties that could be located on the left –the 
Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira (PSDB) and the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT)– 
came years later. In the case of Mexico it could have been expected that the centre-right PAN 
would have favoured a targeted model like SPS, but in Brazil it was a centrist government with 
strong conservative influence which introduced the SUS. Political party orientation could 
explain the choice for the Mexican reform, but not of the Brazilian one. 
Another way in which democracy has been linked to welfare reform in Latin America is by 
opening the political environment. It has been argued that political liberalisation provides the 
space for a wide debate on social issues and for the incorporation of new actors –like civil 
society organisations– into the policymaking process (Kaufman and Nelson, 2005). This is 
what happened in the case of the Brazilian reform with the incorporation of the sanitaristas 
into the government. In the case of Mexico, however, it would appear that democracy did not 
open up the political environment sufficiently enough to incorporate new actors into the social 
policy sphere. The Mexican democratic transition centred on the creation of a competitive 
electoral system (Nacif, 2003, Elizondo Mayer-Serra and Nacif, 2002).  
Electoral competition and the attempts to decentralise services do not explain the choice of 
reform models. The ideological orientation of parties in power could explain the Mexican 
reform, but not of the Brazilian one. In the latter case, the role of civil society appears to have 
a strong explanatory potential of why a centre-right coalition in power introduced a reform of 
leftist orientation. The next section tests the hypothesis that the reasons for the universalist 
reform in Brazil lie in the incorporation of civil society actors into the decision structures of the 
state, and analyses it in a comparative perspective with the Mexican case.  
The role of social mobilisation 
A second task in process tracing is to test whether a particular hypothesis caused the event 
that is trying to be explained (Mahoney, 2015), by analysing how causal processes took place 
and identifying their timing and sequencing (Waldner, 2015). The timing or conjunctures 
around an institutional or policy change refer to the interaction effects produced by certain 
events that occur at the same historical moment; sequencing refers to the order in which the 
events that influence the change occur (Pierson, 2004). For the cases under analysis, 
assuming that the role of civil society actors was crucial for the introduction of the Brazilian 
reform, the question would be how was it that in Brazil the democratic transition created the 
space for the incorporation of actors that proposed a structural social policy reform of universal 
features like the SUS; whilst in contrast, in Mexico no similar process unfolded.  
The 1980s were times of both intense mobilisation for greater democratisation and 
contestation against neoliberalism throughout Latin America (Ferrero, 2014). The economic 
crisis that had hit Latin American countries in the 1980s, triggered a series of social protests. 
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Historic high levels of poverty and inequality which had at least to a certain level been 
ameliorated by the high economic growth rates of the previous four decades, exploded as a 
result of the debt crisis that hit Mexico first in 1982, and then by the structural adjustment 
programmes that were implemented at the recommendation of international financial 
institutions (Hipsher, 1998, Huber and Scott, 2004). Throughout the region, social protest 
capitalised from the generalised discontent and pressures for greater democratisation 
increased in every country (Hipsher, 1998).  
Social mobilisation eventually became the main driver of the Brazilian healthcare reform. 
Social movements protests resulted first in the election of the opposition president in 1985, 
and then, crucial for the reform analysed here, in the decision in 1986 to call for elections of a 
constituent assembly that would be responsible for enacting a new constitution. Once the 
assembly was installed in early 1987, pressures from social movements managed to open up 
the debate on the drafting of the new constitution to public consultation (Versiani, 2010).  
The Movimento pela Reforma Sanitária –where the sanitaristas emerged from–, was one 
among many civil society organisations that participated in the transition process demanding 
an answer to the question of the ‘social debt’. Given the strong pressures from civil society 
actors, the political class was prompted to open up the political environment to include them 
in the debate around institutional and policy changes (Ferrero, 2014). In the same year that 
the constituent assembly was being elected, the sanitaristas took over the national health 
conference, where they imposed their concept of public healthcare provision as a universal 
social right, which they would incorporate into the new constitution (Sader, 1999, Fleury, 2011, 
Versiani, 2010). 
The new constitution would end up establishing as principal goals of the Brazilian Republic, 
the fight against poverty and social inequalities. The right to health reflected in the mandate 
for the creation of the SUS was assumed as a fundamental element to achieve those aims 
(Versiani, 2010). The reformers had an ideological commitment to the notion of health as a 
social right, which had been spearheaded by the social movement that where they had 
participated since the 1970s, and the conjuncture an open process of democratisation and 
large scale institutional changes, enabled them to incorporate it into the country’s institutional 
framework. 
In Mexico, the timing and sequencing of events around the Mexican healthcare reform were 
very different. The 1980s in this country were also a period of intense social mobilisation. Many 
of these movements would coalesce around the presidential candidacy of Cárdenas in 1988. 
However, contrary to what happened in Brazil, the decade of the 1980s would not bring about 
the democratic transition. Cárdenas was defeated by Carlos Salinas amidst accusations of 
fraud, but after the elections, the PRI temporarily recovered its hegemonic position by boosting 
electoral support through measures like implementing clientelistic social programmes, making 
concessions to the centre-right Partido Acción Nacional (PAN), and temporarily stabilising the 
economy (Diaz-Cayeros et al., 2012); in the mid-term elections of 1991 it regained a large 
majority in congress and won the presidential elections again in 1994 by a large margin. The 
Salinas government would represent the consolidation of neoliberalism and of liberal 
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technocrats in the state’s structure. Social mobilisation levels decreased and by 1995, many 
of the organisations that had supported Cárdenas in 1988 did not do so in that year. The 
Salinas government managed to put forward its ambitious programme of liberal reforms in 
alliance with the PAN (Rodríguez Araujo, 2010). 
Social mobilisation surged again by the mid-1990s demanding fair and equitable elections. 
Social protests and the need to open up the political system after Zapatista rebellion and the 
political and economic crises of 1994-1995, became the main reasons why the government 
decided to negotiate the electoral reform that resulted in the transition (Aguayo, 2010). 
However, in contrast to Brazil, social mobilisation mostly focused on electoral issues, whilst 
the Zapatista movement centred on the rights of indigenous people and did not have an 
influence on other policy areas. 
Demands for greater democratisation by social movements had a definitive effect on the 
transition process, but the political environment was not opened up enough to include social 
issues into the transition agenda. Beyond electoral reform, social mobilisation did not have an 
influence on the transition process. The incorporation of new actors into the decision-making 
structures of the state was limited, and the democratic transition represented more of a 
continuity with the liberal institutional and policy paths followed by previous administrations 
(Teichman, 2002, Rodríguez Araujo, 2010).  
Proposals for reforming the state and implementing large-scale institutional changes – 
including a new constitution–, were halted (Carpizo, 2011, Aguayo, 2010), as the Fox 
government chose to privilege its alliance with conservative elements of the PRI and the 
business sector, with the aim of continuing the programme of liberal reforms (Teichman, 2002, 
Rodríguez Araujo, 2010). Since no deep institutional changes were undertaken, no political 
space was created for the incorporation of actors that could have brought demands for a more 
egalitarian model of social policy reforms. 
Hence, the Mexican healthcare reform was proposed and designed by liberal policymakers 
identified with the same group that had been in charge of health policy in the country since the 
1980s, associated to FUNSALUD (Abrantes, 2010). In fact, SPS follows the same targeted 
logic of a smaller programme called Essential Health Package, implemented in 1997 to 
provide a limited number of medical interventions for poor population with no social insurance 
(Laurell, 2001). The main difference is that SPS also applied an insurance logic, as reformers 
sought to promote a ‘culture of pre-payment’ and to create a market for the purchasing and 
provision of services between private and public actors (Frenk, 2005). 
Figure 1 displays the sequencing of events that lead to the reforms, parting from the 
democratic transitions, understood as the periods of political liberalisation that immediately 
influenced the election of an opposition candidate in the presidency. The main cause that 
explains the differences is the role that social mobilisation played in each country’s democratic 
transition. In Brazil, social mobilisation during the democratic transition, concerned with the 
fight against poverty and inequality and the establishment of social rights, was able to 
permeate the structures of the state to propose a universal reform. On the other hand, in 
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Mexico, the absence of social mobilisation in favour of social rights during the transition 
explains the continuity of liberal technocrats who proposed the market based targeted 
insurance reform model. The differences in the models that each group of reformers proposed 
was due to their ideational commitment to a certain notion of social policy, either as a universal 
social right in Brazil, or as a targeted mechanism conditional on contributions from recipients 
and with competition among providers in Mexico. 
Figure 1 Sequencing of events for healthcare reforms 
Brazil Mexico 
Democratic transition with social 
mobilisation for social rights 
 
Democratic transition with social 
mobilisation focused on electoral reform  
Open democratisation large scale 
institutional changes and popular 
participation 
 
Closed democratisation focused on 
electoral reform with narrow participation  
Incorporation of sanitaristas into the 
transition government 
 
Ratification of liberal technocrats in 
transition government 
Universal health reform model Targeted market based insurance reform 
model 
 
 
Concluding Reflections 
Both reforms have represented important efforts to expand public healthcare to groups of the 
population that for decades had been excluded from the action of the state. Yet, as has been 
explained, the model of reform matters because of the different consequences that each one 
can have for the population. The argument was made that the explanation for universalism in 
social policy can be found in the role that social mobilisation played during democratisation 
and policy reform processes. Whilst in Brazil the democratic transition enabled the 
incorporation into the structures of the state of grassroots actors concerned with an egalitarian 
model of public healthcare provision, in Mexico a narrower process of democratisation resulted 
in the continuity of policy actors that favoured a targeted model.  
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This article has demonstrated how social mobilisation can represent the difference when it 
comes to the adoption of universal social policy models that can have a greater positive impact 
on the welfare of the population. In the absence of pressures from grassroots movements, 
social policy may follow a similar fragmented path than that of the previous authoritarian 
regimes, as it happened in Mexico.  
Social policies based on universal principles are believed to hold a greater potential at tackling 
poverty and inequality. There is evidence that this is true when comparing the Brazilian 
healthcare system with the Mexican fragmented system. Moreover, recent protests in Brazil 
have put demands to improve healthcare services at the centre of the public agenda, which 
would suggest that indeed universal social rights serve to aggregate political preferences. In 
Mexico, demands for better healthcare are scarce to say the least; in this country, a 
fragmented system could be blocking collective action. Further research is needed to 
investigate how policy promotes or blocks collective action, but it would seem that the ‘paradox 
of redistribution’ would be occurring in the cases analysed here.   
This article also showed that rather than a unique process of democratisation and political 
liberalisation in the continent, the cases of Mexico and Brazil highlight the existence of different 
types of transitions. Zooming in at the healthcare reforms at times of political liberalisation and 
democratisation, from a comparative perspective, has revealed the mechanisms influencing 
the production of divergent policy reforms models.         
The social mobilisation from below that forged the political transition managed from above in 
Brazil contributed to permeate the character of the transition and the conceptual orientation of 
the policy reforms enacted in the process. Although the transition in Brazil was possible due 
to elite pacts, it was the activation of unions and social movement organisation who 
established the narrative of the ‘social debt’. In doing so, the discourse of social justice was 
mobilised from the margins to the mainstream, influencing institutional and sectorial reform. 
The transition in Mexico replicated the presence of the elite pact but it also showed the 
absence of a new contentious social narrative.  
The evidence provided in the article is particularly relevant to (re)think the nature of state-
society relations in contexts of democratisation. In Brazil, social movement organisations 
activated their members by raising new demands associated to the narrative of social justice. 
These demands were directed to the state which was perceived as a territory to be colonised 
rather than an apparatus to be toppled. As a consequence, the presence of the sanitaristas, 
who used the academic jargon to legitimise their narrative and gain broader societal 
consensus, was perceived as an achievement for the progressive forces and not as the result 
of state co-optation.  
It was indeed the strategy of engagement with institutions followed by social movements in 
Brazil that produced lasting institutional legacies. The most apparent was the creation of a 
healthcare system of universal principles. And the more subtle but equally important was the 
opening of a fissure within the structures of the state which evidently contributed to prevent 
the total institutionalisation of neoliberalism as the hegemonic logic structuring the state.   
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